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Abstract
The Caribbean region  suffers from a high degree of  Auffret develops  a conceptual  framework  for risk
economic volatility.  A history  of repeated external  and  management  and shows that the insurance  market for
domestic  shocks  has made  economic  insecurity a major  catastrophic  risk in the Caribbean  region remains  a
concern  across  the region.  Of particular  concern to all  "thin" market  characterized  by "high"  prices and "low"
households,  especially  the  poorest segments of the  transfer  of risk. He  analyzes the possible market failures
population, is the exposure  to shocks  that are generated  which  could explain the  lack of development  of the
by catastrophic events or natural disasters.  catastrophe  insurance  market. Finally  he outlines  a set of
recommendations  for public sector  interventions.
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The Caribbean  region  suffers  from a high degree of economic  volatility.  A history  of repeated
external and  domestic  shocks has made  economic  insecurity a major concern  across the region.
Of particular concern  to all households,  especially  the poorest segments  of the population, is the
exposure to shocks that are generated by catastrophic events or natural disasters.
This  paper develops a conceptual  framework  for risk management  and shows that the  insurance
market  for  catastrophic  risk in the  Caribbean  region  remains  a "thin"  market  characterized  by
"high"  prices and  "low"  transfer  of risk (Section  A).  Section  B  analyzes  the possible  market
failures  which  could  explain  the  lack  of development  of the  catastrophe  insurance  market.
Finally,  Section  C  concludes  by summarizing  the market  failures  that prevail  in  the Caribbean
region and outlines a set of recommendations  for public sector interventions.
A.  Risk Management: A Conceptual Framework'
Risk management means reducing risk to an acceptable  level and coping with the consequences
of risk  once  it  materializes  (Figure  2.1).  Risk  management  can  be broadly  divided  into  risk-
reduction  activities  (that focus  on reducing  the effects of disasters should they occur)  and risk-
coping  activities (that focus  on reducing the negative effects of natural disasters once they have
occurred).2 Risk-reduction  activities  include  risk identification,  mitigation  and preparedness:
Risk identification  is  the most important  component  of risk management,  since risk mitigation
and preparedness  directly depend on the original assessment  of risk.  Risk identification involves
a risk assessment,  which quantifies the spatial  and time evaluations  of natural hazards and whose
objective  is to forecast the location,  frequency,  duration and magnitude of natural hazards.3 Risk
mitigation measures  involve reducing  human and asset vulnerability  to risks.  They  include the
construction of dams or re-channeling of rivers to regulate  river flows and to limit probabilities of
floods  downstream  while  reforestation  of watersheds  and  stabilization  of unstable  slopes  can
prevent the occurrence  of landslides  and floods.  Risk mitigation measures  also include  investing
in  hazard-resistant  technology  such  as  retrofitting  of  infrastructure  using  hazard-resistant
techniques,  building mitigation  infrastructure  such as retaining walls,  and resettling population at
risk.  This  may be  complicated  by the  fact  that  many households  in  high-risk  areas  have  low
income and limited relocation alternatives.  Risk mitigation measures  also include non-structural
instruments  such  as  land-use  planning,  building  codes  and other  regulatory  instruments.  Risk
mitigation  also includes the diversification  of income  sources through diversification of the types
of crops cultivated in terms of harvest seasons, resistance to flood, strong winds and other natural
X  This Section  draws on Charvenat (2000), Chapter 3.
2 Some authors use the term nsk-transfer  instead of nsk-coping but both terms refer to the same phenomenon.  See  for
example,  World Bank, 2002(b).
3Risk-identification  can be complemented with vulnerability  assessments which are based upon information about the
presence of population and assets  exposed in the hazardous zones as well as their vulnerability to damages.
4disasters.  Marriage  to out-of-area  spouses  for the  sake of the cormnunities'  children  is another
risk-diversification  strategy used by traditional societies.  Preparedness consists of lessening the
impact  of  disasters  by  structuring  in  advance  the  ability  to  respond  to  an  emergency.
Preparedness activities include hazard monitoring,  forecasting, early warning systems, evacuation
plans  and shelters,  specialized  networks of responders  and contingency plans  in critical  sectors.
They focus on short-term damage control rather than reduction of vulnerability.
Figure 2.1:  A Conceptual Framework for Risk-Management
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5Risk-coping  activities reduce  the negative  effects  of natural  disasters  once they have occurred.
They  do  not  intend  to  reduce  the  amount  of physical  damages,  but  focus  on  reducing  the
consequences  on welfare by smoothing the  shocks over space and time.  Saving and resorting to
the rmancial market are coping mechanisms.  Households  can accumulate  savings and assets  in
the absence of disasters  and reduce  them in the aftermath.  They may have to deplete their asset
base by selling livestock, for example,  in order to cope with the shock  Migrating with the intent
of sending private remittances when shocks  arise is another coping mechanism.  At the aggregate
level, public transfers in the form of food, shelters and emergency employment programs can play
a key role  in smoothing the shock for the most vulnerable segment of the population.  Access to
financing  in  the  form  of grants  or  loans  help  alleviate  the  negative  shocks.  This  includes
contingent  financing  from  bilateral  and  multilateral  assistance  in  the  form  of  grants  and
concessional  or non-concessional  lending.  Aid can also come as debt relief while countries with
better access  to international private  markets  may resort to private financing on the  intemational
markets.  Insurance is  another coping mechanism.  Traditional  insurance may be available as an
instrument  to  protect  against  natural  events.  Households  and  firms  pay  a  premium  to  cover
natural  hazards  and  are  reimbursed  for  the  damages  if  a  disaster  occurs.  New  financial
instruments such as catastrophe bonds may also provide an altemative to traditional insurance  for
reinsurers,  Govermments  and  large  companies.  Box  2.1  illustrates  the  importance  of risk
management by analyzing the example of Hurricane  Georges which hit the Dominican Republic
in October  1998.  Two new  regional  initiatives,  the  development  of a proposed  Strategy  and
Results Framework  for Comprehensive  Disaster Management  in the  Caribbean (CDM)  and the
establishment of the Disaster Mitigation Facility for the Caribbean  (DMFC) within the Caribbean
Development  Bank,  may  enhance  the  potential  for  coordination  and  integration  of  risk
management activities in the region (Box 2.2).
The objective  of risk-management  is to find the policy mix which maximizes  welfare among the
risk management  options  available,  while  the  objective  of public  policy  is to  intervene  when
market failures prevent the private sector from maximizing society's welfare on its own.
6Box  2.1: Risk Management:  The Case of Hurricane Georges  in the Dominican  Republic
The  lack  of national  emergency  management  capability  was  clearly  manifested  after  Hurricane  Georges  hit  the
Dominican Republic in October  1998.  The population was not appropriately  forewarned about the imminent hurricane,
and  the  preparation  measures  taken  were  vastly inadequate.  The  Govemment relies  primarily  on  three  agencies  to
respond  to natural  disasters:  the Red  Cross, the Civil  Defense, and the National  Meteorology Office.  The Red Cross
tned  to warn the  population  about  the  hurricane  in  the  days  before  it touched  down, but had  lirmted  resources  and
support  to  do  so.  However,  it was quite  effective  in coordinating  the emergency  relief effort  in  the aftermath of the
hurricane,  marshalling  support  from  NGOs  and  international  branches  of the  Red  Cross.  The  Civil  Defense,  a
Govemment  agency,  is  poorly  staffed  and  has  very weak  institutional  capacity.  It did  not forewarn  the population
about  the hurricane  and,  in  the  aftermath,  was  unable  to play  a significant  role  in the relief  effort.  The  National
Meteorology  Office  (ONM),  a government  entity that depends  on  the Mmistry  of Agriculture,  was  also ill-equipped
and poorly staffed.  While it provided  accurate  information  in the days preceding the hurricane,  it was hampered  by
deficient communications  technology.  The impact of the humcane was greatly exacerbated  by the  lack of preventive
capabilities of the Government,  as evidenced  by the fact that the hurricane hit other countries  like Puerto Rico equally
hard but caused minimal damage and no fatalities.
In the Dominican  Republic, the Asociacion Dominicana  de Mitigacion de Desastres  (ADMD) and a coalition of NGOs
have  championed  disaster  preparedness  and  prevention  among  the  most  vulnerable  communities,  conducting
workshops  in  over  700  communities  since  1995.  At  these  workshops,  local  participants  prepare  a  community
emergency plan,  which  is  built on  an assessment of local  hazard vulnerabilities  and of locally  available  resources to
address  those  vulnerabilities.  During  Humcane  Georges  (1998),  communities  that  had  established  emergency
committees through this program successfully  evacuated people from flood prone areas, established  shelters, organized
clean-up  brigades,  and  requested  and  distributed  assistance  without incident.  In  addition,  these  communities  have
identified and implemented small risk reduction projects and actions.  Projects,  such as the construction of  containment
walls and drainage ditch embankments,  are designed  to address local health and environmental  contamination problems
as well as reduce and mitigate the constant floods and landslides, which are a daily concem for these communities.  The
positive effect of these  initiatives  was demonstrated  by the reduced  impact of Hurricane  Georges on the participating
communities.
The  authorities  declared  a state  of emergency  the  day  after  the hurricane  and  immediately requested  assistance  for
reconstruction  from  the  intemational  community.  Soon  after,  the  Govemment  created  the  Solidarity  Fund  for
Reconstruction,  in order to pool the emergency resources from the state,  public and private donations, as well as loans
from  bilateral  and  multilateral  organizations.  The  authorities  acknowledged  the  serious  shortcomings  of their
emergency management  capability  and announced a program  for the restructuring and modemization of the institutions
responsible for disaster management.  The Puerto Rico offices of the US National Weather  Service (NWS) and the US
Federal  Emergency Management  Agency  (FEMA) provided technical assistance  to the  Government of the Dominican
Republic to  elaborate  such  a program.  The  main  components  of the  program  include:  (i)  specialized  early waming
equipment for the  ONM; (it)  technical and logistical  support for disaster preparedness  and response;  and  (iii) training
for  national-level  ONM  staff  in disaster  preparedness,  and  for  local  staff in  helping  local  govemments  and  rural
communities to prepare for and respond to emergencies  ansing from recurring  natural disasters.
Source  From Hurncane Georges Emergency Recovery Project,  World Bank, December  1998 and World Bank, 2002(b).
7Box  2.2: Developing  a Regional  Risk Management Strategy
Disaster Mitigation Facility for the Caribbean (DMFC).  In 2001, with  support  from the USAID Office of Foreign
Disaster  Assistance,  the  Canbbean  Development  Bank  (CDB)  established  the  Disaster  Mitigation  Facility  for  the
Canbbean,  marking  an important  step  toward the  promotion  and coordmation  of risk management  within the  region.
The CDB assists  borrowing member states, across a broad range of activities  and sectors,  including poverty reduction,
infrastructure  development  and  environmental  management,  placing  it in  a strong position  to promote  and coordinate
activities  in sectors that have  not traditionally  addressed  directly hazard nsk management.  The DMFC will  focus.on
the  incorporation  of hazard  nsk management  into development decision  making within  the internal  operations of the
CDB,  its  borrowing  member  countries  and  regional  institutions.  Activities  of the  DMFC  include  support  for
strengthened  building  standards  and  enforcement  mechanisms  and  assistance  to  member  countnes  with  the
development of national-level  nsk management policies  and plans.
Comprehensive  Disaster Management Strategy (CDM).  Also in  2001,  a working group,  representing regional  and
national disaster  management  organizations,  the private sector, regional technical  institutions and multi- and bi-lateral
donors  and  lending  institutions  developed  a  proposed  Strategy Results  Framework for  Comprehensive Disaster
Management in  the Caribbean. Funding  for the development  of this strategy was  provided  by USAID and  UNDP.
This  strategy  was  undertaken  with  the  objective  of  integratng  comprehensive  disaster  management  into  the
development  process  within  the  region,  providmg  an  important  framework  for  strengthening  and  coordinating  risk
management  efforts.  The  proposed  CDM  strategy  emphasizes  hazard  risk  reduction.  Within  this  framework,  the
institutional  capacity  and role  of the Canbbean Disaster  Emergency Response  Agency (CDERA)  to promote CDM  at
the regional  level  will be strengthened.  At the national level, consultations  are being held to encourage  governments to
develop  national  strategies  within the CDM  framework  and to identify  champions  for hazard nsk management at the
ministerial level and within the private sector.
Source: World Bank, 2002(b).
8B.  The Insurance  Marketfor Catastrophic  Risk in the Caribbean
Based on an in-depth review of the insurance market for catastrophe  risk in the Caribbean region
(Box 2.3), this Section seeks to answer the following questions:
*  Is the Caribbean catastrophe insurance market efficient at transferring  catastrophic risks?
*  What market failures could explain the lack of development of the catastrophe insurance
market?
Box  2.3: Insurance Classification : Where Does Catastrophe Insurance Fit In?
The provision of insurance  is classified  into life insurance  and non-life insurance  with  the foaner insuring against the
loss of life.  Although it varies slightly across countries,  the classification of  non-life  insurance may be divided  into six
classes:  (1) property;  (2)  marine,  aviation  and transport;  (3)  motor  vehicle;  (4) pecuniary  loss;  (5)  liability;  and  (6)
personal  injury.  Insurance against natural  hazards like earthquakes  and  hurricanes are usually covered  under the first
four  classes.  Coverage  against  catastrophic  perils  are  bundled  and  sold  together  with  other  penls  such  as  fire,
explosion, riots  and strikes,  aviation and motor vehicle collision.  Motor vehicles, buildings and contents,  other assets,
infrastructure,  and  income denved  from  some productive  assets  are  typically insured  against hurricanes,  earthquakes
and other perils under motor vehicle, property and other types of insurance policies, and pecuniary losses.
It is estimated  that about 45  percent  of total non-life premiums  corresponds  to insurance  against natural  hazards.  In
Tnnidad  and  Tobago  and  the Dominican  Republic,  prenmums  are split  between  natural  hazards  and  other  risks.  In
these countries, under property insurance, the premiums that correspond to coverage for catastrophic events account for
about  45  percent  of  total  premiums.  However,  most  Caribbean  insurance  companies  do  not routinely  split  the
catastrophe elements of their premiums.  Earthquake and hurricane  premiums are bundled with the premiums of other
perils.  Premium  splits are  available from re-insurance  companies,  which indicates  that on  average about 25 percent  of
the premiums  in the  property class  correspond  to insurance  against  earthquake,  20 percent  against hurricanes  and the
remaining 55 percent against other perils mcluding fire.
B.).  Characteristics of the  Caribbean Insurance Market for  Catastrophic Risk:  "Low"
quantities of  risk transfer and "high  "prices.
Disaster insurance  coverage  in the Caribbean region increased  in the second  half of the  1990s.
There  was a severe tightening  of the world catastrophe  reinsurance  markets following Florida's
Hurricane  Andrew  (1992)  and  California's  Northridge  Earthquake  (1994),  whose  damages
exceeded  US$45  billion  in  1997  dollars, with the insured component  running to  almost US$30
billion.4 This caused  some stress on the capital  base of the insurance and reinsurance  companies
which,  together  with  an increase  in  the risk assessment  of catastrophic  events,5 led to a steep
increase  in insurance  and re-insurance  prices and a decline  in insurance  availability (Graphs  2.1
and 2.2).6  Only relatively minor insured  catastrophic  losses occurred  after  1994 which,  together
with  the  creation  of some  public/private  partnerships  (Box  2.9),  allowed  the  insurance  and
reinsurance companies to progressively restore their capital base.  As  a consequence,  rates started
to fall and risk transfers  increased.  The cost of catastrophe  insurance is currently  approximately
at the same level as it was in the early 1990s.
4 Froot, 1997, p. 2.
5  There were few such large storms between 1970 and 1992 so the probability of occurrence was estimated to be low.
6 Eleven  insurers  in  Florida were declared  insolvent  as a direct result of the hurricane;  many  others  required capital
infusion  from  their parent  companies.  By May  1995,  93 percent  of the  insurers  in the Califomia market had  either
stopped underwriting earthquake insurance or imposed restrictions on existing policies.
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Source  Background papers  and catastrophe insance pnces from Pollner,  2001,  p.25.
10Quantities of risk transfer remain  "low".  The catastrophe  insurance market  does not cater to all
segments  of the  economy.  The proportion of residential  and commercial  properties covered  by
insurance  is  significant  in  the  Caribbean  region.  However,  the  vast  majority  of  insured
properties  are  hotels,  tourism-related  properties,  large  and  medium-size  private  industrial  and
commercial  businesses  while  many  dwellings  and  small  businesses  remain uninsured.  Fragile
dwellings  constructed  in hazard-prone,  low-lying coastal  areas, deep river basins  or valleys  and
along steep  slopes are  generally  not insured.  For example,  a large segment of the population  in
Barbados, Jamaica  and Trinidad and Tobago lives in vulnerable,  uninsurable  properties  (lacking
dug-in foundations,  secured  frames  or bolted roofs) which could be easily dislodged  in the  event
of flooding or strong winds.8 In  Santo Domingo,  the Dominican  capital, about  300,000  people
live  in  the  high-risk,  flood-prone  and  highly polluted  Ozama  River  Basin  with  no  insurance
against  flood  either.  In  addition,  crop  insurance  is  not  generally  available  in  the  Caribbean
region, which makes farmers (especially poor farmers) particularly  vulnerable to natural disasters.
Two  companies  in  Barbados  offer  coverage  on  standing  sugarcane  crops  and  the produce  of
larger plantations.  However,  their coverage options  do not benefit small- or medium-size  farming
operations.  About  two  decades  ago,  Trinidad  and  Tobago's  sugar  industry  purchased  crop
insurance  on the international market but this initiative  was discontinued due to few claims results
and  to  escalating  premiums.  The  Dominican  Republic  established  the  now  defunct  crops
insurance  program through Banco Agricola de la Repuiblica Dominicana (BARD),  twenty years
ago.  For small-scale  farm  workers  or owners,  state  institutions  and  agencies  may be  the  sole
resort  for debt relief and financial  assistance  in case  of catastrophic  occurrences.  International
experience  suggests that crop insurance  initiatives have generally been unsuccessful  and that new
initiatives like the creation of weather-indexed  securities may not be more promising especially in
developing  countries  (Box  2.4).  In  addition,  the public  sector does  not generally  insure  public
assets against catastrophic events under the prevailing insurance market conditions  (Box 2.5).
Box  2.4:  Weather-Indexed  Securities  as an Alternative to Crop Insurance?
Many  observers  have  argued  that  mechanisms  can  be  developed  to bring  catastrophic  exposures  directly  to  the
international  capital  market.  One such  mechanism includes  the development  of catastrophe-indexed  securities  which
make  payments to  the holders  based  on  the  trigger of an  index.  Such  index  may be based  on  the  magnitude of a
hurricane  using the  Saffir-Simpson  scale as declared  by the National Hurricane  Center located  in Miami,  Florida, or
indices  compiled by Property Claims Service  (PCS), the authoritative  insurance  industry statistical  agent that reports
on  catastrophes.  The  World  Bank  is  also  considering  the  development  of weather-indexed  securities  to  protect
agncultural producers  located  on the hurricane-prone  East coast of Central America.
Indexed-based instruments  have not taken off as expected.  The  Chicago Board  of Trade (CBOT) introduced  futures
and options linked to the PSC index  in  1992.  However, the  future contracts  failed to generate sufficient interest and
were withdrawn  in 1995.  Option contracts based  on nine indices  currently trade on the CBOT:  a national  index,  five
regional  indices, and  three  state  indices  (for  Califomia,  Florida  and  Texas).  The Bermuda  Commodities  Exchange
(BCE)  currently  trades  contracts  based  on  a US  homeowners  catastrophe  index  developed  by  Guy  Carpenter.
However, the development  of these markets has not generated the interest  that had been initially expected.  The main
reason seems to be that the existing indexes remain poorly correlated with individual  losses.  Hurricanes  typically hit
the areas of a country very differently and have different impacts depending on landscape  characteristics,  for example.
To serve as good insurer hedges,  indices will need to be developed  for small geographic areas,  ideally  at the level of
the farm  owner.  However,  establishing  such  indices  would  pose  considerable  technical  difficulties,  especially  in
developing countries.
7 In most Caribbean  countries,  property owners  are required  to purchase  a catastrophe  insurance  to access  mortgage
financing.  However,  once  outstanding  mortgages  have  been  paid  off a large  number  of property  owners  either
undennsure  or do not insure their properties  at all.  The requirement to buy catastrophe  insurance only applies to those
who have access to the formal mortgage  market, leaving out the poor.  See also Pollner, 2001, p. 37
8  These are called "Chattel" houses;  they are properties made of timber and generally moveable.
11Box 2.5: Should Governments Insure Public Assets?
The  public  sector  does  not  generally  insure  public  assets  against  catastrophic  events.  It  does  not  carry  basic
catastrophe  insurance  on  public  buildings,  infrastructure  and  other  public  assets.  State-owned  enterprises  are  not
insured  either,  wvth the  exception  of Trnidad  and Tobago  where state-owned  enterprises do  have  some catastrophe
insurance.
This behavior may be  optimal given prevailing insurance market conditions.  Indeed, the public sector  may be able to
secure  external  financing,  in the  form of a line of credit,  to  cope with  disasters.  Such  a line of credit needs  to be
secured before  the occurrence  of a  natural  hazard  since  the natural  hazard  may impair  public finance  and  limit  the
Govemment's  access  to  intemational  financing.  This  option  may be better  than  insuring public assets  and paying
"high"  insurance premiums.  To mitigate  moral hazard problems at the  insurer level (Govemments  may decide not to
engage  in risk-reduction activities once the line of credit  is secured);  intemational  financial  institutions could consider
providing  a  line  of credit  contingent  upon  the  implementation  of a  set of risk-reduction  measures  including  rnsk
identification, mitigation  and preparedness.
Another alternative is to create  a natural disaster fiind to reduce dependency  on extemal funds for coping with disaster
risks.  In  1996, Mexico  created  a  federal calamity  fund (Fondo para  Desastres Naturales) of US$200 million whose
funds  come  from  federal  and  state  fiscal  resources  and  are  earmarked  for  the repair  of uninsured  infrastructure,
immediate assistance to restore the  production of subsistence farmers  and relief to low-income  disaster victims.  The
Assembly of Puerto Rico in 1994 voted for the creation of a Reserve for Catastrophe  Losses under which a portion of
property  insurance  premiums  is  passed,  with  tax  deduction,  to  a  trust.  It  is  anticipated  that this  mechanism  will
improve  the  availability  and  affordability  of catastrophe  insurance  and  reduce  the  dependency  of Puerto  Rican
insurers on  foreign reinsurance.  In Colombia,  the federal govemment, regions, and localities are all obliged by law to
pay a part of their budget  into a natural  disaster  fund.  In  October  1999,  Costa Rica  and Nicaragua  reformed  their
institutional  disaster management  systems and  created national  funds  to finance future  emergencies.  Honduras  also
announced its intention  to create  a similar fund.
Source  Country  examples are from Charvenat,  2001, p 89.
12Comparing insured losses to total  losses that result from catastrophic events further evidences the
"low"  quantities of risk transfer at both the international  level and that of the Caribbean  region.
Graph  2.3  shows  that  a  small  portion  of  total  losses  are  effectively  insured.  As  already
mentioned, Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge Earthquake totaled over US$45 billion in 1997
dollars, with the insured component amounting to US$30 billion.  In terms of insurance coverage,
oily  3.8  percent  of the  damages  from  natural  catastrophes  between  1985  and  1999  in  Latin
America and the Caribbean were insured,  ranking it last among the regions of the world.9
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Prices of catastrophe insurance are "high".  Non-life insurance penetration  (written premiums  as a
share  of GDP) in the  Caribbean  region  is  comparable  to that  of industrialized  countries  (Table
2.1).  In the Caribbean  region, it is estimated  that about half of non-life  premiums (equivalent  to
1.5  percent  of GDP)  corresponds  to coverage  against  natural hazards  (Box  2.3).  However,  as
shown  above,  the  quantity of risk  transfer  is "low"  in  the Caribbean  region.  High  insurance
penetration  and "low"  quantities  of risk transfer indicate  that the prices of catastrophe  insurance
in the Caribbean  region are  "high".  The fact that catastrophe insurance  premiums are  estimated
to represent  about  1.5  percent of GDP while  average  (insured and uninsured)  losses per annum
accounted  for only about 0.5 percent of GDP during the period  1970-99  (whereas they would be
equal under "fair" pricing) further confirms  this finding.
9 Insured  losses in other regions during the same period were North America, 34.5 percent; Europe, 26.7 percent;
Africa,  8.9 percent and Asia 4.3 percent.  Data are from Swiss Re.  Reported in Charveriat,  2000, p. 41.
13Table 2.1: Insurance Penetration for Selected Countries
(Gross Written Premium as Percentage of GDP, 1998)
Insurance Penetration
Countrles/Regions  Non-Life  Average Economic Losses
Life  Catastrophe  Other  Total  Total  (% of GDP)'
Tnnidad & Tobago  0.89  1.80  2.20  4.00  4.89  0.01
Dominican Republic  0.21  0.68  0.83  1.50  1.71  0.58
Jamaica  3.43  1.13  1.38  2.50  5.93  0.98
Barbados  1.18  2.07  2.53  4.60  5.78  0.21
Average  1.43  1.42  1.73  3.15  4.58  0.44
Memo:
Latin America  0.20  1.41  1.61  0.35
United  States  6.63  4.30  10.93
Japan  6.40  2.30  8.70
France  3.76  2.80  6.56
United Kingdom  8.72  3.10  11.82
Industrialized EconomlesV  4.52  2.95  7.60
The  figure for average economic losses is derived by dividing total economic losses reported in  Table  1.6 for the period 1970-99
by 30 years.
2J  Includes  12 industnahzed  economies.
Source: Swiss-Re,  Economic Research &  Consulting and Background  Papers.
14B.2.  Prices of  catastrophe insurance  are "high" and quantities  of  risk transfer are "low": The
Presence of  Market Failures?
This Section articulates eleven different explanations that may help account for the "low" transfer
and "high" prices which characterize  the Caribbean  catastrophe insurance market (Box 2.6).
Box  2.6: The Insurance/Reinsurance  Market for Catastrophic Risks: How Does it Work?
Protection  against natural  hazards is usually available  from intemational  or local  insurance  companies.  In general,
local companies do not directly underwrite policy but instead use a network of agents (brokers)  or subagents.  Agents
can  be  individuals,  corporate  entities  or  institutions  appointed  by  the  insurers  to  solicit  or  negotiate  insurance
coverage  on behalf of the  insurer  and, as  authonzed, to provide  riders and countersign  contracts.  However, they are
not  insurers'  employees.  Subagents  are  authorized  appointees  of agents  who  can  solicit  or  negotiate  insurance
transactions  through  that agent,  or may be an individual  designated  by the sub-agent to  solicit or negotiate  insurance
business through  the sub-agent.  They are not agents'  employees.
Primary insurers  are vulnerable to catastrophic events that affect the small-territory  Caribbean  economies where they
are located although  claim deductibles  (around 5 percent for earthquakes  and between  I and 2 percent for hurricanes)
limit  possible  losses.  Usually,  they  turn  to  the  international  reinsurance  market  to  reinsure  themselves  against
possible  catastrophic  losses.  Most  reinsurance  is  wntten  on  a "treaty"  basis.  There  are  two  types  of "treaty"
reinsurance:  proportional  reinsurance  or  quota  share,  and  excess-of-loss  (XOL).  With  proportional  reinsurance,
reinsurers  assume  a specific  portion  of insurers'  risk in exchange  for that particular  share of the premiums.  In the
Caribbean  region,  the ceding  company currently retains between 20 and 30 percent  of the original risk.  Proportional
reinsurance  is  the most popular form of protection  among primary insurers in the Caribbean region, with  about three-
quarters of property premiums ceded  in proportional  contracts.  With  XOL reinsurance,  the ceding company retains
risk up  to a certain amount  of losses  while reinsurers  insure  losses  in excess  of this  amount  and generally  up  to a
layer.  For example,  an insurer can purchase reinsurance  to protect itself against 20 percent of losses between US$100
million and US$200 million,  which is called a layer of protection.  This means that, dunng the tenure of the contract,
the reinsurer  would  cover all  events  that result  in the  insurer's  losses in excess  of US$100  million,  but only  until
insurer's  losses reach US$200 million.  Should insurer's losses be US$300 million,  the remsurer will pay 20 percent
of the difference between US$200  million and US$ 100 million or US$20 million.  In the Caribbean region,  insurers
use  XOL reinsurance  to  protect  between  15  and  20  percent of the retained  exposure.  The  fact is  that insurance
companies  buy  reinsurance  coverage  from  reinsurance  companies  in  order  to protect  against  probable  maximum
losses (PML) which have been estimated  at  15 to 20 percent of the total exposure.  Insurance companies spend about
half of their retained premiums to pay for the cost of XOL reinsurance.  Excess-of-loss reinsurance  is often purchased
in up-to three layers; standard contracts are for one year.
15Explanation  1:  Prices of catastrophe  insurance are "high" and  quantities of risk transfer
are  "low"  because  the provision  of  risk identification  and  of  forecasting  is  insufficiently
developed
Forecasting  the location, frequency,  duration and magnitude of future catastrophic  events is a key
element  of preparedness.  Indeed,  risk  identification  is the  most important  component  of risk
management,  since  risk-reduction  and  preparedness  policies  directly  depend  on  the  original
assessment  of risk.  This  is  particularly  important  in  the  case  of natural  disasters  which  are
characterized by their low frequency  and difficult predictability.,0 In the agriculture  sector, long-
term  climate  forecasts  are  essential  to  switching  crops  and  reducing  losses.  In  several  Latin
American  countries,  such as  Peru  and  Brazil,  meteorological  forecasts  and  agronomic  research
into versatile  hybrid crops have combined to significantly  reduce crop destruction during drought
years."
Risk  identification  and  forecasting  of  future  catastrophic  events  require  the  use  of  costly
techniques  which  include  the  study of historical  records,  topographical  information,  remote-
sensing  imagery  and  aerial  photography  and the  development  of highly  sophisticated  forecast
models.  However,  institutions in  charge of research and prevention of disasters are inexistent  or
grossly  under-funded  in the  Caribbean  region  (Charveriat,  2000,  p.  93),  although  this  may be
changing  with the  recent  creation  of two  regional  risk management  institutions (Box 2.2).22  In
addition,  the private  sector  may not find it profitable  to  invest in  technologies with  high fixed
costs for the sake of providing  catastrophe insurance/reinsurance  to the somewhat limited market
of small  Caribbean  economies.  As  a consequence,  insurance  and  reinsurance  companies  are
likely  to  under-invest  in  risk  modeling  technology  in  the  Caribbean  region.  Although  an
increasing  number  of  Caribbean-based  companies  are  promoting  the  use  of  technology  by
allocating significant portions of their budgets to acquisitions  and upgrades,  most of them do not
as yet have access to the relevant tools and equipment.
Forecasting the location,  frequency,  duration and magnitude of future catastrophic events is also a
key element  in pricing catastrophic  risks.  In the absence of the appropriate  technology that can
identify  and  forecast  risk in the  Caribbean  region,  intemational  reinsurers have  set catastrophe
premiums  in the Caribbean  region  close  to those  that  apply in developed  countries  -primarily
on the basis of losses experienced in the large, diversified economies  of the United States, Europe
and Japan  where  most of their  exposure  is  concentrated.  To  substantiate,  while  there  was no
major catastrophic  event  in the Caribbean  in the early  1990s,  reinsurance  premiums  more  than
doubled in the region because of losses experienced  by insurance  and reinsurance  companies  in
the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew  and the Northridge Earthquake.
Private  markets,  by themselves,  do  not provide  high quality,  publicly  available  information  on
risk,  which  lowers  the  level of preparedness  and increases  the damages  of catastrophic  events.
Consequently,  low preparedness  contributes to explain the "high" costs of and "low" demand for
catastrophe  insurance/reinsurance.  In  the  Caribbean  region,  the  public  sector,  possibly  as  a
regional initiative, could provide incentives to the private sector, including universities,'3 to foster
10  For instance,  when  the Soufriere  Hills volcano  in Montserrat  became  active again  in 1996,  its last  eruption  had
occurred 250 years before.  In the case of El  Nino, the  frequency  is higher:  there have been three recognized  episodes
of El Nino over the last twenty years:  1982-83,  1991-92 and  1996-97.
" Mjelde, Hill and Griffiths (1998, p. 1093)  reported in Charveriat,  2000, p. 73.
12 For more on this issue see also World Bank, 2002 (b) and (c) which provide an in-depth analysis  of the institutional
shortcomings in natural  risk management in the Caribbean  region.
13 For example,  Professor  William  Gray of Colorado  State University  makes publicly available  forecast regarding the
occurrence  of hurricanes.  Some information  is  also available from specialized  departments of insurance  companies.
16scientific  research and improve technology.' 4 It could also ensure the dissemination  of results to
the agencies  in charge of national emergency management.
Explanation 2:  Prices  of catastrophe  insurance  are "high"  and quantities  of risk transfer
are "low"  because  insurers  do  not  discriminate by zone  of risk or the implementation  of
risk-reduction measures, which amplifies adverse selection and moral hazard.
Even  though  conditions  of housing  stock  and  investment  in  mitigation  differ  among  clients,
insurance  companies do not systematically  discriminate  by either zone of risk or implementation
of  risk-reduction  measures.  Catastrophic  risk  insurers  in  the  Caribbean  region  do  not
systematically  discriminate between  areas that are  considered  high risk for natural catastrophes
and those areas where  risks are lower.  In Jamaica, for example, there is no differentiation  in the
rates charged for insuring against earthquake in the coastal regions  of Kingston, where the risk is
greater,  and Montego Bay in the interior, where  the risk is lower.  Theoretically,  the  Dominican
Republic  is  divided  into  five  risk zones  but  there  is no  rate  discrimination  among  them.  In
addition,  insurers  do not provide  rate  credits  or premium  abatements  for risk-reduction  features
that reduce  the  extent  of catastrophic  damages.  In  fact,  local  insurers  have  been  consistently
averse  to  offering  discriminatory  pricing  to consumers  for catastrophic  risks,  even in  instances
where  steps  have  been  taken  to  reduce  the  size  of probable  losses.  It  is  estimated  that  an
expenditure  of I percent  of property  value  on  vulnerability  reduction  measures  can reduce  the
estimated maximum loss from a category 3 hurricane by at least 30 percent.  Anchoring walls into
well-dug foundations,  reinforcing wall segments  with pillars,  fusing walls into roof supports and
fixing roof sheeting  into roof supports provide effective  resistance  to high winds.  In  Barbados
and Trinidad and Tobago steps are being taken toward rate discrimination by offering concession
rates to structurally  sound buildings;  however,  current policyholders  do not as yet benefit  from
such preferential  treatment.
The absence  of price  discrimination  by risk zones and the  presence  of risk-reduction  measures
lead invariably  to adverse  selection and moral  hazard which,  in turn,  lower the  quantity of risk
transfers.'5 Adverse  selection  refers  to the  fact that  individuals  who live  in high-risk  areas  are
likely to  buy more  insurance than  those  in low-risk areas.  This  practice increases  the  insurers'
exposure  to  risk,  reduces  the  supply  of catastrophic  transfer  and,  ultimately,  leads  to  higher
prices.  Moral hazard  refers  to the fact that once  insured,  individuals  are not likely to engage in
risk-reduction  activities  that  would  reduce  the  negative  effects  of potential  natural  disasters.
Moral hazard leads to high premiums which further depress risk transfers.
Moral hazard can be reduced through deductibles  or supply of insurance cover conditioned upon
the adoption of mitigation techniques.  Adverse  selection can be alleviated by the implementation
of compulsory  insurance  schemes  and premium differentiation  by  level of risk.  However,  the
origins  of these market  failures  are  likely  to lie  in the  low provision of risk identification  and
forecasting (Explanation  1) and the deficient land-use regulation and building codes (Explanation
4).  Indeed,  it  is  reasonable  to expect  that once  these more  fundamental  causes  are  resolved,
catastrophe  insurance  and  reinsurance  companies  will  offer  contracts  that  will  mitigate  moral
hazard and adverse selection, as they do in more developed economies.
4  World Bank, 2002(b), p. vii makes identical recommendations.
15  In fact adverse selection may lead to a complete disappearance  of the market for catastrophe insurance (Akerlof,
1970).
17Explanation 3: Demand for catastrophe insurance is "low" because people  are not rational
Given  the  low  frequency  risk  of natural  disasters  and  their  complexity,  individuals  are  less
susceptible  to be rational:  they under-invest  in mitigation  and under-insure.  Moreover,  collective
memory might not be a reliable basis on which to gauge the risk of a natural disaster.  A case  in
point: the  Dominican Republic was hit by Hurricane  Georges in  1998  but had not been affected
by a significant catastrophe since 1979.  In fact, many hurricanes have made landfall on the island
since  the  late  1970s  but  none  had  a  significantly  negative  impact  on  the  economy.  The
Dominican Republic  also straddles  five tectonic  plates which make it very vulnerable to seismic
activities;  however,  the last  earthquake  occurred  some two generations  ago in  1946.  Hurricane
Gilbert in  1988 was Jamaica's  first major catastrophic  shock since the earthquake  of 1907.  In the
current collective  memory of the Dominican  Republic and Jamaica,  therefore, the  probability of
serious damage from an earthquake is extremely remote.
Public  interventions  may help  correct  this  market  failure.  The  public  sector  may  engage  in
information  campaigns  to  provide  accurate  information  on  catastrophic  risk.  However,
experience  shows that even if the benefits of insuring are identified and disseminated,  people will
continue  to under-invest  in  mitigation  and to under-insure.  Public interventions  to rectify  this
market  failure could be in the form of providing incentives  to those who invest in risk-reduction
measures.  Individuals  and  firms  who  purchase  insurance  could  also be  granted  tax  credits  or
deductions,  for example.  Although  this might be difficult  to enforce  in poor and marginal areas
that are most at risk, consideration  could be given  to legislating mandatory catastrophe  insurance
coverage.
Explanation  4:  Prices  of  catastrophe  insurance  are  "high"  and  supply  of  catastrophe
insurance is  "low"  because  land-use  regulations  and building  codes  are inexistent  or not
enforced
In  many  Caribbean  countries,  the  lack of enforcement  of existing  land-use  regulations  and of
building  codes  limits  access  to  catastrophe  insurance  or  makes  catastrophe  insurance
unaffordable.  The presence  of properties in high-risk areas eitfier prevents  insurance  companies
from offering comprehensive  coverage to those who most need insurance protection or places the
cost  of insurance  out  of reach  of  those  who  cannot  afford  high  premiums.  Dwellings  are
constructed in hazard-prone,  low-lying coastal  areas,  deep river basins  or valleys and along steep
slopes.  In  Santo  Domingo,  the  Dominican  capital,  about 300,000  people  live  in the high-risk,
flood-prone  and highly polluted  Ozama River Basin.  "Chattel" houses  in Barbados, Jamaica and
Trinidad  and Tobago  are another  example  of vulnerable,  uninsurable  properties  (lacking dug-in
foundations,  secured  frames  or  bolted  roofs)  which  could  be  easily dislodged  in  the  event  of
flooding  or strong winds.  Compliance  with building  codes  ensures  minimal  damage  and some
structural survival in the event of a catastrophe.  It also lowers the costs of catastrophe  insurance.
In  the  Caribbean  region,  however,  houses  are  not  built  in  compliance  with  engineering
requirements  or location restrictions.'6 Even if they exist, legal codes and provisions in the region
tend  to  be  outdated  or  inadequate.  Jamaica  adopted  building  codes  and  earthquake  hazard
mitigation policies after its last earthquake  in 1907.  There are currently  no official building codes
or  standards  in  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  although  substantial  work  has  been  done  in  the  field.
Barbados's  first building  code was  drafted  in  1992 but is yet to pass  into law.  The  Dominican
Republic has  a uniform building  code (UBC),  similar to the California  building code, but only a
16 For an in-depth review of  this issue see World Bank, 2002 (b) and (c).
18handful of construction  projects comply with its provisions.  It is important that the public sector
adopt and enforce land-use regulations and building codes.
Explanation 5: Demand for catastrophe insurance is "low" because  insurance payments are
delayed.
There is a general  perception  that insurers  are quick to collect premiums  but very  slow to settle
claims or meet other customer needs.  This is particularly the case with catastrophic  events which
may generate  at once  a  large number  of claims  that may exceed  the response  capacity  of most
insurers  and lead to  lengthy  appraisals  of damages.  However,  there  is  little evidence  that  this
factor is perceived differently in the Caribbean region than in developed economies.
Explanation  6:  Supply  of catastrophe insurance  is  "low"  because  of  distortions brought
about by  the existence  of public insurance/reinsurance companies.
International  experience  indicates  that public  provision  of catastrophe  insurance  or reinsurance
has not proved successful  (Box 2.7).  The public provision of catastrophe  insurance  discourages
the  development  of a  private  market.  For  example,  the  creation  of a  public  flood  insurance
program  in the United  States  in the  1930s  displaced  the  existing  private  market.  Under  such
conditions,  the public sector has to bear the  costs of damages  or contingent liabilities  which can,
in  turn,  have  unexpected  negative  impacts  on  the  country's  fiscal  deficit.  Public  sector
interventions  have been more successful  when they aim at helping to restore a private catastrophe
insurance  market whose capital base has been stressed because  of the occurrence  of particularly
devastating  catastrophic  events.  The  public  sector  can  then  provide  insurance  at  the  highest
layers of risk (see Explanation 9).
With  one exception,  no insurance  or reinsurance  company  in the  Caribbean  region  is publicly.
owned.  The Insurance  Corporation of Barbados (ICB) was established in  1978 to insure assets of
the state and of certain  statutory boards,  as well as to underwrite  and manage all classes of risk in
Barbados.  The  government  of Trinidad  and  Tobago  attempted  to  create  a  public  insurance
company in the 1970s but shelved the idea in favor of setting up a reinsurance  company  in  1978
with private sector  share participation  of 40 percent.  This company  was privatized  in the  1990s.
In Jamaica  and the Dominican Republic,  catastrophe  insurance is sold exclusively by the private
sector.
19Box 2.7: Examples  of Public Provision of Disaster Insurance or Reinsurance
The mix  between private  and public  arrangements  to provide catastrophe  insurance vanes widely  among  developed
countries.  In  some countnes  the  public  sector  has  traditionally  kept  a leading  role  in providing  coverage  against
catastrophic events.  This box reviews  the roles played by both private  and public sectors and the rationale for public
sector  intervention  in  some  developed  countries  (e.g.:  Spain,  France,  New  Zealand,  U.S.,  Japan)  and  make
recommendations  regarding the mix between private and public interventions feasible in the Caribbean region.
United States
The National Flood Insurance  Program provides insurance  coverage against floods in eligible communities that have
flood  nsk assessments  and  mitigation  programs.  By the end of  1997,  an  amount of US$430 billion  (or  30 to 35
percent of assets  in  nsk areas)  was  covered  by the  NFIP  throughout  flood nsk  areas.  The  NFIP  does  not  seek
reinsurance  in intemational  markets.  Supported  by the  Federal  Emergency Management Agency,  this mechanism  is
currently  indebted to the tune of US$800  million.  Should the Federal  Govemment  declare an area a national  disaster
zone  (50 percent of disasters),  disaster  victims will be eligible  for grants  and loans at subsidized  interest rates.  This
type of govemment assistance  discourages property owners from purchasing  insurance coverage  directly from private
insurance companies.
Spain
Insurance  coverage  for  natural  hazards  are  covered  by  the  Consorcio de  Compensacion de  seguros,  a  public
corporation  which  receives  a  fixed  proportion  of every  premium  of property  insurance  contracted  by  insurance
companies.  If the insurance  industry experiences  an excessive  loss as the result of a natural disaster, the  govemment
will be  responsible for any associated  liabilities  that the industry  experiences.  In essence,  insurance  companies  are
guaranteed  that no catastrophic  event  shall wipe them out  completely because  the govemment  will cover  all losses
above a certain  limit.  For most Spaniards,  this arrangement  means that securing disaster insurance  is relatively easy;
for the  insurance industry it has enhanced  a deeper market penetration.
France
The French system,  CCR, was created  in July  1982 after serious flooding m the Saone Valley in southwestem France
in late  1981.  The system provides cover for losses from natural disasters (flooding, earthquakes, droughts, etc.).  The
French  system  is  based  on  the  solidarity  concept  and  hence  provides  for compulsory  coverage  for all  real  estate
property and movables  (including  vehicles).  Policyholders  are  subject to  an additional  flat percentage  of the policy
premium.  The  state  guarantee  operates  at  the reinsurance  level  and  provides for  the cost of direct  damage  to the
property  up  to  the  value  specified  in  the  insurance  contract  (real  estate  property  and movables,  including  motor
vehicles).  The insurers are responsible for loss adjustment and settling claims.
The premiums ceded to the state-owned  reinsurance  company  (CCR) is the primary source of capital for the system.
This system operates  at two levels.  First, compulsory inclusion  in all underlying policies against natural disasters  for
an extra-premium.  Second,  unlimited  reinsurance  coverage  for natural  disaster  risks,  offered by state-owned  CCR,
with  an explicit  state  guarantee  to insurance.  The range of companies'  cession  rates  is between  40 percent and  90
percent, with the average cession rate being 45 percent.
Brazil
Brazil's Instituto de Resseguros,  which wielded a monopoly in the country's reinsurance  industry, has recently been
transformed  into ajoint stock company whose majority shares are held by the Govemment.  Fire risks (which include
floods,  the main hazards  in Brazil) are the company's  major line of business and account for 33 percent of the total
retained premium volume.
Source.  Charveriat, 2000, p. 78 and Kalavakonda, 2002.
20Explanation  7:  Prices  of  catastrophe  insurance are  "high" and risk transfers are "low"
because the structure of contracts for insurance/reinsurance is inefficient.
Available  evidence  suggests that "high"  prices and "low"  transfers do not derive from inefficient
insurance  and reinsurance  contracts.  In  fact,  in the wake of Hurricane  Andrew  (Florida,  1992)
and  the  Northridge  Earthquake  (California,  1994),  insurance/reinsurance  contracts  have
introduced  new  clauses  and have  become  more  efficient  over  time  at transferring  catastrophic
risk.'7 Reinsurance  companies  have  introduced  event  and  cession  limits  which  have  allowed
them to place a ceiling on the aggregate  amount for which they could be  exposed.'8 They have
set  deductibles that  limit their own  exposure  and that of insurers.  To prevent  underinsurance,
they also  introduced more stringent  conditions  like  the average  clause  which  stipulates that the
claim  payment  would be reduced by  the underinsured  amount  of the property  in the event  of a
partial  loss.  Consequently,  "high"  prices  and  "low  transfers"  are  unlikely  to  derive  from  the
inefficiency of the structure of insurance/reinsurance  contracts.
Explanation  8:  Quantities  of risk transfer are  "low" because  insurance  and re-insurance
companies  have market power.
Although there  has  been a general  consolidation  of the  reinsurance  and insurance  industry over
time,  the  general  view  is  that  "high"  prices  and  "low"  risk  transfers  are  not  associated  with
greater  market  power.  The  evidence  indicates  a  secular  consolidation  of  insurance  and
reinsurance  companies  in  the  Caribbean  region  and  worldwide.  The  number  of  insurance
companies  in  the  Caribbean  region  is  on  the  decline.  In  Jamaica,  the  number  of insurers
decreased from 19 in 1988 to  14 in 1998,  while in Trinidad and Tobago it declined from 30 to 18
during  the same period.  In  Barbados,  15  general  insurance  companies  were  operating  in  1998
versus 25 in 1972.  More than 40 insurance companies were operating  in the Dominican Republic
in  1998  compared  to  over 50  in  1984.  Clearly,  the industry  is  consolidating.  The  five  most
important  insurance  companies  in Trinidad  and Tobago  controlled  81  percent of the  market in
1997  (compared  to  65  percent  in  1992)  while  the  five  largest  insurance  companies  in  the
Dominican  Republic underwrote  about  81  percent of total property  premiums in  1998  compared
to about 63 percent in 1990.  Mergers and acquisitions have also reduced the number of reinsurers
worldwide.  The market  share of the four most important  reinsurance  groups  increased  from 23
percent  in  1991  to  33  percent  in  1998.  However,  these  trends  do  not  necessarily  reflect
increased  market  power.  Consolidation  leads  to  a  structure  that  optimizes  the  catastrophe
reinsurance/insurance  industry's  ability  to  finance  the  large  fixed  costs  associated  with  risk
identification,  forecasting  and  systems  technologies  (see  Explanation  1).  In  addition,  entry of
new  capital  into  the Bermudan  reinsurers,  beginning  in  1993,  suggests  that barriers  to  capital
entry are not overwhelming,  which leads to the conclusion that the incumbents'  market power is
not itself overwhelming.
Also agents and sub-agents have not increased their market power.  Competition at the agent and
sub-agent  level has increased  in the  1990s.  First,  the  number of agents  has  increased  in most
countries  including  the  Dominican  Republic,  Trinidad  and  Tobago  and  Jamaica  (where  the
number of local intermediaries  increased  from  62 in  1989 to 72 in  1998).  Second,  commissions
earned by local agents  have declined  substantially,  which would  not have been the case if these
7 Box 2.6 provides a description of catastrophe  insurance/reinsurance contracts.
18  These contracts  are very important for developed  countries like the United  States where damages can be substantial.
However,  in the Caribbean,  loss  limits were set  above the  full  replacement  value of probable  maximum assets  which
decreases their relevance for the region.
21agents  had market  power.  For example,  in  the Dominican  Republic,  the commissions  paid to
local  agents  for  property  insurance  transactions  declined  from  14  percent  of total  property
insurance premiums in 1990 to about 10 percent in 1998.
Explanation  9:  Prices  of  catastrophe  insurance  are "high" and  risk transfers  are "low"
because  there is insufficient  reinsurance capital.
"High"  prices  and  "low"  risk  transfers  in  the  Caribbean  cannot  be  explained  by insufficient
reinsurance  capital.  First,  insurance  losses  from  a  large  catastrophic  event  in  the  Caribbean
would not stress  the reinsurers'  capital  base.  Indeed,  the  economic  costs of large catastrophic
events  in the Caribbean  region are  in  the  order  of a few  billion  dollars  and  most damages  are
uninsured,  while estimates of total capital and surplus of US insurers alone approximated US$350
billion in 2000.  In fact, it is estimated that only about 2 percent of global demand for reinsurance
originates  from  the  Caribbean  (Graph  2.4).  Thus,  at  present  levels  of capital,  the  worldwide
reinsurance  industry  is largely  capable  of coping with a  catastrophic  event  that is  limited to the
Caribbean region.
Graph 2.4:  Reinsurance Demand by Region,  1998
Rest  of the Wortd












Sre  s..  Re
Second,  following  Florida's  Hurricane  Andrew  (1992)  and California's  Northridge  Earthquake
(1994)  reinsurance  capacity  for  the  Caribbean  catastrophic  exposures  market  was  contracted
through withdrawals by some reinsurers,  even though there were no major crises in the Caribbean
region.  This led to the emergence  of the Bermuda  market  with its additional  capacity  so that,
today,  the  worldwide  supply  of  reinsurance  originates  in  four  primary  markets:  Bermuda,
continental  Europe,  London,  and the United  States (Graph 2.5), which provides further evidence
that reinsurance capital is sufficient in the Caribbean region.
22Graph 2.5:  Reinsurance supply by market
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"Cat" bonds (Box 2.8) and  the creation of a public-private partnership (Box 2.9)  are mechanisms
that aim  at  restoring  a  stressed  capital  base.  Their relevance  for the Caribbean  region  is thus
limited.
Box 2.8: Catastrophe Bonds:  An Option for the Caribbean  Region?
The  damages  from Hurrcane  Andrew  (Florida,  1992)  and  the  Northridge  Earthquake  (Los  Angeles,  1994)  alone
exceeded  US$45  billion,  with  the  insured  component  running  into  US$30  billion.  The  losses  are comparable  to
cumulative  insured losses from  natural catastrophes  in the previous decade of about US$25 billion.  These two events
led to the collapse of several  property and casualty insurers.
The  capitalization  of the US insurance  industry  (estimates  of total  capital  and  surplus were about  US$350 billion  at
end-2000)  may not be sufficient  to cover  a series of catastrophic  events of the same magnitude  as Hurricane  Andrew,
the Northridge  Earthquake or a remake of the 1906  San Francisco  Earthquake.  Essentially,  the "big one" could wipe
out the entire capital  base of the insurance  industry.
In response,  the insurance  industry has  issued Catastrophe  ("cat") bonds designed  to spread  the industry's  catastrophic
risk to the capital  markets rather than keeping  it on  insurers'  own balance sheets,  thereby reducing  exposure  to major
catastrophic  events.  This also reassures policyholders  that they would be protected  against even  the largest of losses.
The  first "cat"  bonds  came  to market  in  1994,  and  many  more have  since  been  issued.  Aside  from spreading  huge
losses  more  widely,  the  bonds may bring more stability to a reinsurance  market known  for  fluctuating  rates and  for
developing sudden aversions for certain types of risks.
However, "caf' bonds have little relevance for the Caribbean  region.  Indeed, intemational reinsurance exposures to the
region  is  extremely limited (estimated  at 2 percent of total premiums), which little justifies the transfer of such  risk to
the capital market.
23Box 2.9: Public/Private Partnerships in Catastrophic Risk Insurance
In  1992,  Hurricanes  Andrew (Florida)  and Inicki  (Hawaii)  generated  considerable  damages.  Payments  for insured
damages  distressed the insurance/reinsurance  industry's capital base.  As a consequence, many insurers and reinsurers
reevaluated  their exposure  to catastrophic  events  and decided  to stop providing  catastrophe  risk policies,  mostly in
Hawaii, Florida and  Califomia.  The  Govemments of the three states  decided to intervene and led initiatives  with the
pnvate sector to restore the catastrophe  insurance market
Since  insurance  and  reinsurance companies  were reluctant to provide catastrophic  insurance  based on the possibility
that  another  event  would  deplete  their  capital  base,  the  state  decided  to  create  private/public  partnership  and  to
provide  contingent  funding  at  the highest  layers  of risk'  (thereby  offering  protection  against  a depletion  of the
insurance  and reinsurance  mdustry capital base).  In case a catastrophic  event generates  damages above the level that
insurance/reinsurance  companies could afford, the partnership  could issue bonds and use the proceeds for reinsurance.
Pnvate  insurers  and  reinsurers  would  pay back  interests  and  principal  on  the  bonds  from  future  premiums.  The
mechanism  could  be  discontinued  once  the  absence  of  another  catastrophic  event  has  allowed  the
insurance/reinsurance  companies  to  restore  their capital  base.  Pnvate/public  parnertships  have  been  successful  at
reviving a moribund  catastrophic  insurance  market,  including  the  Hawaii  Hurrcane  Relief Fund (now defunct),  the
Florida Humcane Fund and the California  Earthquake Authority.
Florida Hurricane Fund (FHF)
The FHF provides  insurance  coverage against hurricanes  for residential  property.  It is controlled by Florida's  State
Board Administration  (SBA) and  structured  as a state trust fund without sovereign guarantee.  All  authonzed insurers
are required  by Florida statutes  to enter into a reinsurance  contract with the SBA.  FHF funds come from the payment
of reinsurance premiums.
Unlike pnvate companies which must accumulate sufficient  capital reserves to pay for possible anticipated  losses, the
SBA  can  issue  public bonds  in  the  aftermath  of an  event.  As of end-1997,  FHF's fund  balance was  estimated  at
US$2.0 billion while its bond capacity was estimated  at  US$6 billion.
California Earthquake Authority (CEA)
The  CEA  is  a  privately  funded  and  publicly  managed  entity  which  provides  earthquake  insurance  policy  for
residential  property with more  restrictive covenants  than those offered by the traditional  market.  Its policy does not
set a  limit on the insured value of the basic  structure but includes  a  15  percent deductible.  Also,  the policies do not
provide coverage for damage to buildings, fences, walls, driveways,  pools and other non-residential  structures.  Funds
come from reinsurance premiums  from the participating  insurance companies,  which can provide additional coverage
to supplement the CEA's basic coverage.
The capital of the CEA  is structured  in six sequential  layers.  The highest layers of risk envisage a recourse to credit
facilities and issues to finance the damages from catastrophic events.
' See Box 2 7 for a definition of layers of risk.
Source.  The Economist, Februry 28h, 1998.
24Explanation  10:  Prices  of catastrophe  insurance  are "high"  and risk transfers  are  "low"
because regulation is inadequate.
The regulation  of the  industry is broadly adequate  in the  Caribbean  region  with  the  important
exception  that regulatory  prescription  of investments  by the  insurance  companies  reduces  their
overall profitability, which contributes  to the  observed "high" prices and "low" transfer of risk.'9
For  example,  with  the  exception  of the  Dominican  Republic,  there  is  no  regulatory  barrier
limiting the access of foreign  firms  and protecting  the local  insurance industry  (Tables 2.2 and
2.3).20  However,  the presence  of regulatory  guidelines which restrict investments,  together with
the  presence  of underdeveloped  financial  markets,  limits  insurance  companies'  profitability.
Restrictions to invest on the international  financial  markets also prevent the insurance  companies
from buffering  their assets against  a possible  fallout from  catastrophic  occurrences  (their assets
may  be  heavily  concentrated  in  housing,  which  an  earthquake  could  damage).  This  leads
insurance  companies  to set  prices  above  those  that would prevail  if they could  diversify  their
investments.  "High"  prices  lead  to "low"  level of risk transfer.  It  is reasonable  to  think that
limitations  to assets  diversification  together  with the underdeveloped  capital  markets are at  the
core of the "thin" catastrophe  insurance markets observed in the Caribbean region.
To  correct  these deficiencies,  governments  in the region could take  a series of measures.  First,
they could  allow the insurance  industry to  diversify assets  internationally.  Second,  they  could
foster  the  emergence  and  liquidity  of equity  markets  by  eliminating  stamp  duty  fees,  usury
clauses  (limiting the yields  on  corporate  fixed  income  securities)  and  non-dematerialization  of
securities.  Easing restrictions on foreign assets and highly regulated securities would expand the
base for investment  financing.
19  For  more  on  insurance  regulation  in  the Canbbean  region,  see Pollner,  2001,  for the  OECS  countries  and  the
Background Papers for Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago.  For the Dominican Republic, see the recent Financial
Sector Stability Assessment,  IMF Board document, June 2002 and the Financial Sector  Assessment, World Bank Board
document, June 2002.
20  The  Dominican  Republic  has  the  highest  discrimination  for  foreign  companies  with  higher  minimal  capital
requirements  and corporate tax  liabilities.  The 25 percent income  tax rate is identical for local and foreign companies.
However while net profit constitutes the tax base for local companies,  the net profit of foreign  companies is assumed to
be  10 percent of total underwritten premiums which leads to higher tax liabilities.
1-7Table  2.2:  Insurance Sector Regutory Characteristics in the East Caribbean Markets (US 
Antigua  St. Kitts  St.  St. Vincent  Trinidad
and  Barbados  Dominica  Grenada  and  Lucia  &  the  &
Barbuda  Nevis  Grenadines  Tobago
Minimum
Capital  Local:
Requirement  0.07  1.5  0.07  0.09  0.07  0.10  0.07  0.16
(US$  Foreign:
million)  0.20
Solvency  Minimum  $0.25m  Minimum  $0.06m  Minimum  $0.07m or  Minimum  Minimum
Margin  capital  or  or 25%  capital or  or  10%  capital or  20% of  capital  or  capital or
(Assets - 10% of  of  10% of  of  10% or  premium  10% of  20% of
Liab.) above  premium  premium  premium  premium  premium  income  premium  premium
premium  income  income  income  income  income  income  income
income
Reserve  40% of  30%  10% of  40% of  40% of
Requirement  na  annual  annual  na  annual  annual  na  premium
premium  premium  premium  premium  income
income  income
Premium  Local: 3
Tax (%)  na  5  None  na  5  Foreign: 5  3  6
Corporate
Tax (%)  40  40  30  30  38  33.3  40  35
Tna =  -not  ~available
Source  Pollner, 2001, p. 37
Table 2.3:  Structure of the East Caribbean General/Pro  erty Insurance Market (1998)
Antigua  St.  St. Vincent  Trinidad
and  Barbados  Dominica  Grenada  Kitts  St.  and the  and  Total
Barbuda  and  Lucia  Grenadines  Tobago
Nevis
No. of General
Insurance  16  22  13  19  9  21  12  29  141
Companies
Foreign





Premiums  (Gross  10.6  43.0  5.8  8.6  6.3  11.9  9.6  52.1  148
US$ million)
Gross Premiums
% of GDP  1.8  3.0  2.4  2.7  2.4  2.1  3.3  0.9
'Approximately  75% of these companies are companies  from Barbados, Guyana and Tnnidad &  Tobago
Source  Pollner, 2001, p 37
26Explanation  11:  Quantities  of risk transfer are "low"  because  of the availability of ex-post
international assistance.
Ex-post financing occurs when third parties intervene to finance the losses incurred by the victims
of a natural  disaster.  International  organizations  like the  World  Bank  and the  Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) play major roles in providing disaster-related  assistance  in response to
victims  of  natural  disasters.2'  However,  intemational  emergency  assistance  is  largely
unconditioned  on  the  implementation  of  risk-reduction  measures  and  may  thus  provide  a
disincentive  for countries  to adopt risk-reduction  policies towards  disasters.22 Ex-post  financing
should be viewed as a  form of market failure  since neither the Governments  (nor apparently  the
international  organizations)  can  credibly  commit  not to  fund  disasters  after  the  fact,  since  the
political incentives  to do so ex-post are overwhelming.  This reduces the incentives to buy private
insurance  contracts  against  disasters  or  invest  in  risk-reduction  activities.  It  also  creates  an
incentive for some segments of the population (mostly poor, mostly illegal) to settle in risk-prone
areas since they know that the Government will bail them out eventually.
International  organizations  could  have  a  larger impact  on development  by  switching their  role
from providers of disaster-related  assistance  to initiators  of the implementation  of risk-reduction
measures.  They  could  also  provide  disaster-related  lines  of  credit  contingent  upon  the
implementation  of some  preliminary  risk-reduction  measures.  As  an  incentive,  these  lines  of
credit would have to be above the level of assistance that is normally provided  in the aftermath of
a disaster.
C.  Recommendations  for Public  Sector Interventions
Table  2.4  summarizes  the  market  failures  that  help  explain  the  "thin"  catastrophe  insurance
market observed in the Caribbean region and outlines  a set of recommendations  for public sector
interventions that would contribute to the development of this market.
21  Both multilateral organizations  have substantially increased their assistance to natural disasters over the last decade.
22 It  is interesting  to note  that Cuba, which receives  little  intemational  assistance  for reconstruction,  has  an excellent
preparedness  system and prevents most fatalities from hurricanes.
27Table  2.4: Market Failures  and Recommendations  for Public Sector  Intervent;ons  in the Caribbean
Region
Market Failures  Recommendationsfor Public Sector Interventions
I.  The provision of risk identification  and  *  Foster scientific research
forecasting  is insufficiently developed  *  Improve available  technology
*  Ensure  the dissemination of results to nsk-management agencies  and end-users
2  Insurers do not discnmunate by zone of  Same as market failures I and 4
nsk or the implementation  of risk-
reduction measures
3  People are not rational  *  Engage in information campaigns  to provide accurate information  on catastrophic nsk
*  Provide tax credit for the purchase of catastrophe insurance
*  Provide incentives  to invest  in nsk-reduction  measures
4.  Land-use  regulations and building  0  Establish land-use regulations  and bwlding codes where  inexistent
codes are inexistent or not enforced
*  Enforce land use regulations and buildmg codes
5.  The insurance  industry takes time to
process payments
4  Not a constraint
6  Existence of public  insurance
companies
4  Not a constraint
7.  Inefficient structure of contracts for
insurance/reinsurance
4  Not a constraint
8.  Insurance and re-insurance  companies
have market power
4  Not a constraint
9.  Insufficient reinsurance  capital
4  Not a constraint
10  Inadequate regulation  *  Eliminate  restrictions on foreign  insurance companies
*  Eliminate restrictions on intemational  diversification  of assets
*  Develop domestic capital markets
I1.  Availability of ex-post intemational  Intemational organizations  could.
assistance  *  Switch their role from providers  of disaster-related  assistance  to initiators of the
implementation  of nsk-reduction measures
*  Provide disaster-related  lines of  credit contingent upon the implementation of some
preliminary nsk-reduction measures.
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